The role of misperception in the calculation logic of the American intelligence apparatus and the Zionist regime Case Study: Surprise in Operation October 7
Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 Prophet faculty
2 Department of Regional Studies
Abstract
On October 7, 2023, the Zionist regime was surprised by the attack of Hamas forces from the Gaza Strip. The inability of the American and Israeli intelligence apparatus to detect Hamas attack and warn before it occurs raises many questions about the capabilities of the intelligence community, especially the Military Intelligence Directorate (AMAN), the Israel Security Agency (Shabak), and the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). In this regard, the main question of this article is why the intelligence apparatus of the Zionist regime suffered such a surprise. The intelligence apparatus of this regime, despite having full American scientific and information technology support, while being aware of the strengthening of Hamas forces, evaluated that this group has changed its goals and is seeking to establish a government in Gaza. In this research, descriptively, we analyze the role of misperception in the calculation logic of Israel's intelligence community and CENTCOM in such a way that they concluded that an attack by Hamas would not be possible due to the incitement of a counterattack by Israeli forces, and even if this organization intends to do such an act, they will receive the necessary warnings in advance. However, on the morning of October 7, Israel was surprised by this attack without knowing the intentions of Hamas. This surprise was a strategic error in the calculation logic of the intelligence apparatus of this regime, which also failed the normalization policy of the United States.
Keywords
منابع
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